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INTRODUCTION
During his speech in February 2017, the United States
(US) President, Donald Trump, argued that many coun-
tries have benefited from relatively-low import tariff im-
posed by US authority so they could sell their commodi-
ties as much as they can while they imposed high taxes for
US exports (Schwartz, 2017). Available data supported him
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Abstrak
Artikel ini menganalisis kebijakan perdagangan proteksionis Amerika Serikat (AS) di bawah kepemimpinan Donald Trump. Dengan menerapkan
sejumlah tarif dan kuota terhadap impor pertanian dan manufaktur, Trump memantik perang dengan sejumlah rekan dagang penting dunia.
Problematisasi pertama isu ini ialah kebijakan perdagangan Trump gagal menekan mitra-mitra dagangnya untuk patuh, meski ekspor mereka
lebih bergantung pada pasar AS dibandingkan sebaliknya. Yang kedua ialah sebagian besar lawan perang dagang Trump merupakan negara
demokratis; hal ini merupakan anomali terhadap asumsi yang telah mapan tentang teori perdamaian demokratis bahwa struktur dan norma
yang dipegang negara-negara demokratis mencegah mereka terlibat dalam konfrontasi politik-keamanan dan ekonomi. Melalui nasionalisme
ekonomi dalam perspektif historis serta kerangka analisis nasionalisme dialektika ‘Hegelian’ nasionalisme, artikel ini berargumen bahwa
kebijakan perdagangan proteksionis Donald Trump dapat dianggap sebagai upaya untuk tidak hanya melindungi kepentingan ekonomi
nasional tetapi juga mengamankan kekuasaan politiknya di hadapan para konstituen beserta tuntutannya di level nasional. Manifestasi
tersebut dapat dilacak ke belakang hingga ke konstruksi nasionalisme Amerika yang menunjukkan kesejarahan dari pragmatisme AS terhadap
ekonomi politik global.
Kata kunci: Donald Trump, nasionalisme ekonomi, proteksionisme, kebijakan perdagangan, negara dan pasar.
Abstract
This article aims to analyze the United States’ protectionist trade policies under Donald Trump’s administration. By imposing a set of tariffs
and quotas for such imported agriculture and manufactured products, he triggered a series of trade war to several world key trading
partners. The first problematization of this issue is that Trump’s trade policies failed to push compliances from its trade partner despite their
higher relative export dependency on American market rather than on the contrary. The second is most of Trump’s ‘trade belligerents’ are
democratic countries; therefore, it becomes an anomaly to the prominent assumption of democratic peace theory which stated that struc-
tures and norms held by democratic countries prevent them from engaging both in harsh political-security and economic confrontation.
Through the historical perspective of economic nationalism combined with an analytical framework of ‘Hegelian’ dialectics of nationalism,
this article argues that Donald Trump’s protectionist trade policy can be considered as an attempt to not only protect national economic
interest but also to secure his political power before his constituents and their national postulation. Such manifestation can be traced back
to the construction of American nationalism that shows US historical pragmatic standpoint toward the global political economy.
Keywords: Donald Trump, economic nationalism, protectionism, trade policy, state and market.
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by showing that the US trade deficit to the world increased
from USD 736.58 billion in 2016 to USD 795.69 billion
in 2017 (US Census Bureau, 2018). In this context, China
in 2016 and 2017 became the most contributor with its
trade gap reaching from USD 347 billion (43.6% of US
total world trade deficit) to USD 375.2 billion (47.15%)
(US Census Bureau, 2018). The European Union (EU),
Mexico, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, India, South Korea,
Thailand, Canada, and Taiwan also become the next top
contributors by sharing around 57-58% of US total of world
trade deficit.
President Trump’s unease concern about such unfair
international trade structure faced by the US was trans-
lated into protectionist policies. He ordered US Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC), US Department of
Commerce (DoC), and US Trade Representative (USTR)
to study about the potential harm done by trade partners
toward US market and intellectual properties. US govern-
ment uses Section 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Until
this paper is written, Trump’s safeguard trade policies tar-
geted China, Canada, Mexico, EU, and South Korea, as
the US ‘trade belligerents.’ Cited from Bown and Kolb
(2018), US imposed tariffs and quotas on imported steel
(10%), aluminum (25%), washing machine, solar panel,
and more than 1,300 other products. This trade policy
then provokes those targeted countries to retaliate. South
Korea sued the US through the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) for the
washing machine and the solar panel’s feud (WTO, 2018).
Mexico imposed tariffs on US potato, apple, cheese, pork,
and dairy products worth approximately USD 3 billion
(Swanson & Tankersley, 2018). Canada also imposed tar-
iffs for USD 12.8 billion US steel, aluminum, tomato sauce,
maple syrup, and orange juice exports (Canadian Depart-
ment of Finance, 2018). EU taxes US Harley Davidson,
bourbon, jeans, and cranberries 25% of their worth (Bown,
2018). China, the US biggest trade partner, imposed more
Table 1. US EDR on trade belligerents 2016-2017
Table 2. EDR of trade belligerents on US 2016-2017
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complex measures. Beside US fruits and nuts, pork, and
scrap steel and aluminum worth USD 2.4 billion (Lu &
Schott, 2018), Chinese authority released 106-commodi-
ties list for 25% tariffs worth USD 45 billion (Ministry of
Commerce of P. R. China, 2018). A series of global trade
war then triggered.
There are two problematizations of this issue. First,
President Trump’s trade policy rationalization is based on
the logic that US government will be able to push their
trade interest toward countries whose exports are more
dependent on US market than the opposite way. It can be
shown through export dependency ratio (EDR) which in-
dicates a percentage of a country’s total export to certain
partner country from exporting-country’s total gross na-
tional product/GNP (Zeng, 2004). Ipso facto, the average
of US’s EDR toward trade belligerents during 2016-2017
only ranged from 0.88-5.67% despite the increasing trend
(see Table 1). Meanwhile, the trade belligerents’ EDRs to-
ward the US get a higher range (2.52-28.26%) despite the
decreasing trend on the same period (US Census Bureau,
2018; CEIC, 2018; see Table 2). However, the situation
did not occur as expected. President Trump’s tariff policy
is immediately retaliated by similar or even more complex
measures. Second, four out of the five countries involved
in Trump’s trade war are democratic countries. The situa-
tion somehow ‘falsified’ democratic peace theory which
assumes that structure and norms held by democratic coun-
tries prevent them from engaging in a large scale of con-
flicting relations in both political security (Doyle, 1983)
and economy (Zeng, 2004).
This paper aims to highlight President Trump’s recent
protectionist trade policy with the following research ques-
tion: why does Donald Trump implement the protection-
ist policy to US foreign trade? The hypothetical answer for
this question is that Donald Trump’s protectionist trade
policy (tariffs and quotas) can be considered as an attempt
to not only protect national economic interest but also to
secure his political power before his constituents and their
national postulation. To answer this question, the expla-
nation structured in several parts. After explaining the
economic nationalism that will be utilized as a theoretical
framework, the article will divide the summarized construc-
tion of American nationalism in both political and eco-
nomic sense. It will be useful as a historical modality for
the contemporary discourse of American nationalism
brought by Trump during his campaign and presidency.
The comparative result will be correlated to the trade policy-
making conducted by President Trump.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are two reasons why this paper chooses economic
nationalism as a theoretical framework. First, historical
references show that protectionist trade policy has been
conducted by most of the countries like the US during the
late 18th century, British, Germany, and Japan during the
19th century; their economies depended on state’s inter-
vention and protectionist measures. Only when their
economies become mature, they open their market and
propagate free and fair trade to expand their production
and market (Chang, 2002). Even when the global economy
collapsed during the 1930s Great Depression, their hypoc-
risies led them to pursue protectionist policy. Empirically
speaking, it will be useful to study the phenomenon of so-
called ‘Trumponomics’ from the perspective of economic
nationalism. Second, Steve Bannon who held the admin-
istrative position as Senior Counsel to the President at
that time described President Trump’s economic nation-
alism policy blatantly as anti-thesis to economic globaliza-
tion, trade protectionism, political pressure on the domes-
tic corporation, unilateralism, and economic relations
based on transactional deals (Chu, 2017).
Before discussing economic nationalism, we need to
understand the concept of nation and nationalism. A na-
tion is an imagined community which is inherently lim-
ited and sovereign (Anderson, 2006). It is limited because
the ‘imagination’ only comprises individuals who shared
a similar history, geographical location, language, ethnicity,
custom, and even religion. It is sovereign as a consequence
of two things. First, due to its ‘imaginative’ limitation, if
not exclusive, a nation is prone to focus only on its inter-
nal cohesion. A nation will not try hard to enlarge its cov-
erage to cover the whole humanity quantitatively and quali-
tatively. It will be confusing if a nation tends to be abso-
lutely inclusive in terms of accepting all quantities and
qualities of individuals compared to humanity as general.
Second, a nation is, in fact, a derived product of the Euro-
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pean Westphalian system in the 17th century. The system
creates a new modern polity called state which is self-gov-
erned. It means that this political regime insists every pol-
ity respect each other’s sovereignty by not interfering with
others’ domestic affairs (Polimpung, 2014).
Those characteristics of a nation thus affect our under-
standing of nationalism. Nationalism is understood as an
ideology in which there is an effort to mobilize the whole
political, economic, and cultural resources to reach a na-
tional unity. The unity can be obtained through identity
construction (Anderson, 2006) or acquisition of particu-
lar territory in order to establish nation-state (Gellner,
1983). In particular, nation-state can be considered as an
ultimate purpose for statesmen to follow. Using national-
ism as ‘political vehicle,’ they mobilize society into accept-
ing offered national construction. If society agrees to af-
firm agreed ‘imagined community,’ power relation occurs
where statesmen or political elites become a subject of
nation-state power and society with new national identity
as their objects. The whole process can be seen through
the framework of Hegelian Dialectics in Figure 1.
Figure 1. ‘Hegelian Dialectics’ of Nationalism
Source: Nakano (2004)
Back to the nationalist purpose in economic aspect,
national unity requires whole economic resource. The
economy is considered as a state’s instrument in accumu-
lating power aimed at mobilizing a nation and even to
assess the state’s legitimacy toward a nation. However, al-
most all economic activities related to market mechanism,
which is said to work efficiently only by avoiding external
interventions. By conditioning economy as power accu-
mulation instrument, nationalism demands nation-state
to intervene market mechanism. This is where (nation-)
state and market can relate inter-sectionally; state priori-
tizes security by demonstrating its power to organize its
citizens for (national) unit while market needs to accumu-
late and distribute growing wealth efficiently without ex-
ternal intervention. However, state-market relations are not
always monotonic. It is due to every nation’s differing ex-
perience regarding national unity. It will affect the way
they interpret market (international trade, development
issues, and financial, monetary, and fiscal affairs) and its
relations toward nationalism. Every nation can be differ-
ent in deciding whether a state’s authority must be pre-
ferred to market or the opposite way or being balanced
instead (Strange, 2015). As a consequence, there are many
possibilities to see whether domestic and international
trade can be considered as anti-thesis, substitutive, comple-
mentary, or even integrative—as we will realize through this
paper. Despite such differences, state-market relation in
terms of nationalism demands a certain degree of state
intervention on economic activities because the economy
will be directed for nationalist purposes. Therefore, we can
conclude from given logic that economic nationalism can
be understood as a set of policies conducted by a state by
interfering market mechanism partially or as a whole in
the name of national interest.
This paper uses economic nationalism as a theoretical
framework in a couple of ways. First, it identifies the con-
struction of American nationalism based on its historicity
and discourse. It is useful to give an ideological and politi-
cal basis for further explication regarding Trump’s nation-
alism. In this context, this paper will use literature reviews
as data which refers American socio-political history, some
statistical information about US demography, and indi-
vidual and/or official statesmen from political elites and
other stakeholders from any media source (on/offline).
Secondly, this paper tries to correlate economic national-
ism with its implication toward the way Trump’s adminis-
tration see trade relations and structure with other trad-
ing partners. This paper will use statistical data about the
whole trade balance and each related commodity’s market
configuration and official/academic statesmen regarding
US trade policies under Trump’s administration. This part
is crucial in order to see the correlation between politico-
ideological and economic aspects of contemporary Ameri-
can nationalism.
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RESULT AND ANALYSES
AMERICAN NATIONALISM: FROM REVOLUTION TO COLD WAR
The development of American nationalism can be di-
vided into four stages. The first one is ‘establishment.’ The
term ‘American’ as a nation started to emerge during the
mid-18th century due to Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan.
It was a political proposal in 1754 to establish a union
between thirteen colonies in East Coast as a response to-
ward the threat of French-Indian War—derived from what
would be Seven Years’ War in Europe (Gillon & Matson,
2002). Despite its failure, the plan pioneered the discourse
of self-government among colonies prior to American in-
dependence. Following British Parliament’s series of uni-
lateral tax policies, the colonists argued that any law en-
acted without sufficient representation from constituents
(American colonies) within governing body were illegal
under British Bill of Right 1689. Such clash of interests
led to several conflicts between the colonists and British
(e.g., Boston Massacre, Gaspee Affairs, and Boston Tea
Party).
Many exceptional statesmen from thirteen colonies
responded to the escalating unsolved conflicts with the
British by establishing Continental Congress in 1774. It
was designed to rival the British Parliament for their inter-
nal affairs (Gillon & Matson, 2002). The Congress later
became the founding fathers of the United States of
America (USA) by issuing the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, starting the American Revolution against British
rule for the next seven bloody years. Created in 1777 (rati-
fied in 1781), the Article of Confederation and Perpetual
Union by the Continental Congress then served as the
first constitution before being substituted with the US
Constitution in 1787. The constitutional change marked
the manifestation of a national (or federal) government. It
should be noted that the establishment of USA, along with
its constitutions, was influenced by Enlightenment think-
ing such as John Locke’s Two Treaties of Government and
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense which promoted (indi-
vidual) freedom against (monarchal) tyranny, the right of
self-determination and self-government, civil right, and
constitutionalism as ‘social contract.’ Dialectically speak-
ing, US founding fathers’ Enlightenment influence com-
bined with the urgency from the colonies’ creoles to sepa-
rate from the ‘tyrannical’ British Crown created the very
first experiment of civic nationalism which becomes the
foundation of American identity.
The second stage, which happened around 19th cen-
tury, is ‘emergency.’ American civic tradition founded by
founding fathers were threatened as the enlargement of
the US territory to the South and West were accompanied
by the expansion of slavery and several armed conflicts
with the Indians. The urgency to territorially enlargement
was justified under Manifest Destiny, John O’Sullivan’s
‘theological claim’ from Protestantism that Divine Provi-
dence has obligated American to ‘civilize’ the savage West
(Independence Hall Association, 2018). Such a ‘holy task,’
however, was not fully motivated by religious propaganda.
After financial panic in 1837, there was a public thrust to
‘conquest’ West in order to find other market and re-
sources. This led to the removal of Indian tribes from their
overtaken lands. Moreover, in order to stabilize agricul-
tural production cost and assets, the territorial enlargement
needed to be accompanied by several agrarian policies
which enabled landlords to buy a vast amount of lands
and maximize their export-oriented production. On the
one hand, it could be understood as agriculture dominated
60-80% of US labor force between 1820-1840 (Gibson &
Jung, 2005). As a consequence, the slaved population
(which become the backbone of American antebellum
agriculture) grew from one million in the early 19th cen-
tury to almost 2.9 million in the 1840s (Lebergott, 1966).
The growth of American slavery constructed the no-
tion of white supremacy over black people in which 68%
of them were slaves. Such racism was supported by politi-
cal transformation where Jeffersonian democracy (quasi-
aristocratic system where the right to vote were based on
property ownership) changed into Jacksonian democracy
(popular democracy universal suffrage for white, free
males). It affected the way popular opinion influenced
government in addressing racial issues like slavery and the
enfranchisement of black people. Although US party sys-
tem had changed twice since 1824 US Presidential Elec-
tion (second- and third-party system which distinctively
addressed popular vote and slavery issues) during this stage,
the discourse of racial affairs in America had always been
dominated by pro-slavery and anti-black enfranchisement.
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Furthermore, such political system and culture had fos-
tered the seed of right-wing populism since American po-
litical elites could only aggregate popular opinion from
their white constituents, especially when it related to ra-
cial affairs (both slaved and free African-American could
not vote).
Even though the Civil War (1861-1865) decided north-
ern pro-abolition states’ victory and reconstruction policy
for Southern post-Civil War socio-political transformation,
racism in the US was not faded. National history notes
that between 1869-1924 there were around 156 violent
cases against non-white people where 111 of them were
addressed toward African Americans (Olzak & Shanahan,
2003). In short, the American political system and culture
since the rise of Jacksonian Democracy had dialectically
privileged white, free male citizens in shaping American
civic tradition with ethnic (even racial) nationalism.
The third stage is ‘maturity’ happened from the early
20th century until modern nowadays. There were a couple
of factors shaping modern American nationalism. The first
one is the immigrants. There was an ‘Age of Mass Migra-
tion’ where the total amount of immigrant entering USA
significantly increased from 150,000 people in 1860 to
approximately 1,250,000 people prior to World War I (US
Census Bureau, 1949). However, the Naturalization Act
of 1790 made only whites were eligible for gaining Ameri-
can citizenship. Although some unusual cases like impor-
tation of Chinese labors during Western infrastructure
expansion, American post-reconstruction policies, and
post-Mexican-American-War naturalization of Latino
Americans, they still received some discriminatory assaults.
Even there was some persecution against white European
immigrants whose religion or national descendants were
different.
Sentiment towards immigrants among US citizens
seemed to change into its ambiguous path during the in-
terwar period. On the one hand, America enjoyed what
would be called ‘Roaring Twenties.’ Such unprecedented
economic miracle attracted immigrants from many coun-
tries in Southern and Eastern Europe which were devas-
tated after World War I. Such massive migration rekindled
the widespread of concern that ‘inferior’ immigrants would
overwhelm white, Protestant Americans in labor force,
religious affairs, and socio-political aspects (Gillon &
Matson, 2002). For that reason, the trend of fundamen-
talism, nativism, and supremacism grew again among
white, Protestant Americans (e.g., the revival of Ku Klux
Klan). On the other hand, during the Great Depression
in the 1930s, American economy somehow relied on im-
migrants. They fulfilled high demand for industrial labor
following the New Deal which attracted new labor-intensi-
fied investment in both small and mass production manu-
factures (Hirschman & Mogford, 2009). They also con-
tributed to the growth of American trade abroad and eco-
nomic innovation (Dunlevy & Hutchinson, 1999;
Abramitzky & Boustan, 2017). Not only in the American
economy, but they were also meritorious due to their ser-
vice within the US Armed Force following military natu-
ralization during World War II (US Department of Home-
land Security, 2018). After the war, the US Government
finally enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 which removed racial restrictions for immigration
and naturalization into US citizens.
The second factor is ‘new’ liberalism. Differing from
European (classical) tradition, ‘new’ liberal tradition in the
US is characterized by social liberalism which emphasizes
the combination of basic liberal principles such as civic
liberty and equality with support for socialist principles
like social welfare and justice and mixed economy (Adams,
2001). American people who follow this paradigm are called
‘liberals’ while people who still hold classical liberalism
(by European standards) along with republicanism and
Judeo-Christian values—like US founding fathers’ system
of beliefs—are called ‘conservatives.’ The development of
‘new’ liberalism can be traced back to Progressive Era (1890-
1920). The progressive movement aimed to eliminate prob-
lems caused by industrialization, urbanization, immigra-
tion, and corruption in government (Buenker, Burnham,
& Crunden, 1986)—marking the fourth party system. No-
table advocates included a couple of US Presidents such
as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Their po-
litical philosophies and policies included extensive gov-
ernmental intervention in public affairs and usually ad-
dressing social economic issues (e.g., the campaign of ‘New
Nationalism’ and ‘New Freedom’ in 1912). The manifesta-
tion of ‘new’ liberalism was also strengthened by the fifth
195
party system or ‘New Deal Party System.’ Following the
Great Depression in 1930s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
administration with a grand bipartisan coalition enforced
enormous power to intervene in real economy healing from
depression. Bottom line, it can be inferred in a dialectical
way that immigrants and ‘new’ liberalism brought by pro-
gressive elites had matched with American multicultural
society in reinventing American civic nationalism with
modified modern liberal values.
The fourth stage is ‘expansion.’ Following devastated
Europe after World War II, the US became the new global
power, only to be challenged by the Soviet Union. This
shaped bipolarity of global politics into the Cold War. In
order to prevent the spreading influence of communism,
the US and its allies from North America, Western Eu-
rope, Australia, and Japan, began to adopt what was called
Truman Doctrine—geopolitical containment through proxy
conflict, if necessary—and Marshall Plan—economic devel-
opment aids for allies; will be explained in the later part
(Cincotta et al., 2011). Due to this doctrine, Southeast Asia,
Korea, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and also Cuba be-
came a battlefield for these two great powers and their
respective allies (Gillon & Matson, 2002). Simultaneously,
it marked the end of Monroe Doctrine (American isola-
tionism) and the rise of American proliferation of liberal
and democratic values through both economic and mili-
tary-security alliance—the precedence of NATO (Nau,
2017).
This stage was also marked by a change in US domestic
political system which became more pluralist. Political
powers in the domestic realm from the 1950s were frag-
mented into several units who contested to become policy
influencer—based on the democratic principle of ‘freedom
of association.’ Robert Dahl (1971) described this as
‘polyarchy.’ The main point is that popular democracy in
the US had slowly decreased and reshaped into a kind of
similar structure like Jeffersonian quasi-aristocrat but with
different basis (e.g., limited interest groups who could lobby
government). In this system, entrepreneurs and industri-
alists were parts of dominant business interest group seek-
ing influence toward decision-making process favoring
them, mainly for business expansion (further information
will be detailed in the later section). Combined with Ameri-
can multiculturalism, politics of identity once again came
to prominent issues during the 1960s and 1970s due to
the right deficit for people of colors—African-American,
Latino-American, and Native Indians. The issues included
civil inequality, racial segregation, discriminatory,
overexploitation within workplaces, racial inequality in
political participation, gender inequality, and other socio-
economic rights.
It finally needed at least a series of progressive policies
(New Frontier and Great Society), three new laws (Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Equal-
ity Rights Amendment of 1972), several civilian conflicts,
and some deaths of national leaders such as John F.
Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Malcolm X, etc. to make American multicultural society
become qualitatively expansive and more tolerant. Such
bloody successes, along with the threat of communism
during Cold War and political economic thrust from do-
mestic business to expand their production and investment,
inspired American foreign policy to promote liberal de-
mocracy as a ‘moral cover’ for their military campaign post-
war era. Therefore, in the Cold War context, the rise of
American multinational corporations in global production
and financial structure, and domestic experience about
civil right movements had made American multicultural
society dialectically correlate with American pluralist-demo-
cratic system in which American nationalism incarnated
into something internationalist and expansive. This stage,
in the future, will inspire both hawkish (usually conserva-
tives/modern Republican) and dovish (usually liberal/
modern Democrats) stronghold in shaping American poli-
tics.
The summarized historical construction of American
nationalism, according to Jonathan Monten (2005), has
always been a matter of strengthening and promoting lib-
eral values (including democracy) domestically and abroad.
Through all stages, American civic nationalism has tech-
nically matured in domestic level so they can expand their
ideals abroad. Contextualized with external affairs, both
US domestic policies and even foreign policies are deter-
mined by such mission. Through such ‘performative dis-
tinction,’ it helps American in defining distinctive iden-
tity among nations.
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UNITED STATES ECONOMIC TRADITION: ‘STRATEGIC
ECONOMICS’
There are two foundational arguments in describing
the whole history of the US economy. These following
arguments are interconnected to the way US government
conduct their strategy in favor of economic development
and growth. The first one, related to international eco-
nomic relation, is that the US government have been pur-
sued what is called as ‘strategic economics.’ Michael Lind
(2003) and Ha-Joon Chang (2002) argued that those de-
veloped countries in this era like the US did not follow
economic prescription from classical economist such as
Adam Smith or David Ricardo which emphasized the ‘in-
visible hand.’ Instead, they were pursuing economic na-
tionalism which is characterized mainly by protectionist
trade policies and additional intervention from the gov-
ernment. They added that protectionism was the US de
facto trade policy between 1816 to the end of World War
II. US average tariffs and duties for imported goods be-
tween 1820-1945 was about 35.37% in which Tariff of
Abomination in 1828 and Smoot-Hawley Tariff during
Great Depression in the 1930s reached respectively 65%
and 57.5%—see Figure 2 (US Census Bureau, 1975; US
International Trade Commission, 2010). Despite the stark
fluctuation, US still became one of the countries with the
highest tariffs/duties rate in the world at that time.
Due to the rise of American industrialism between 1840
to 1900, employment in agricultural sector decreased sig-
nificantly from 68% to 40% of US total labor forces when
industry and services growth exponentially respective from
12% and 20% to 26% and 33%. Simultaneously, US agri-
cultural output decreased from 47% to 20% where indus-
try and services output respectively growth from 21% and
31% to 40% and 39% of average price pegged to 1860
(Mokyr, 2018). The significance of industrialism toward
US economy represented a series of economic policies is-
sued by the US government which prioritized industrial
interest over agrarian one. The industrialist class was in
favor of policies which fostered and protected infant in-
dustries from foreign competition. Through tariffs and
duties, US government historically imposed some protec-
tionist regulations such as the Dingley Tariff of 1897, Payne-
Aldrich Tariff of 1909, Underwood Tariff of 1913, Fordney
and McCumber Tariff of 1922, and Smoot-Hawley Tariff
of 1930.
Once US industries reached the stage of maturity, plus
the decline of British economic hegemony and devastated
European economies during two World Wars (Strange,
2015), industrialists chose to expand their market abroad
and become the new global economic power. Using jar-
gons such as free and fair trade, they instructed many coun-
tries, both developed and developing ones, to open their
market and adjust their political-economic structure as what
the US perceived. The US with other Western countries
influenced international financial structure through an
international organization such as International Monetary
Figure 2. Percentage of US Average Tariffs/Duties Imposed to Imported Goods
Source: US Census Bureau & US International Trade Commission
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Fund (IMF), World Bank, and WTO and international
production structure through the expansion of their mul-
tinational companies throughout the world.
The second argument, which related to the domestic
public-private economic relations, is that US economy rep-
resented political contestation between pro-laissez-faire elites
and interventionist elites. This tension firstly appeared as
the US became a newly independent state. Alexander
Hamilton, first US secretary of treasury ever and a federal-
ist partisan, urged interventionist policies by subsidizing
infant industries, establishing a national central bank, and
protectionist tariffs for imported goods. He believed, as
many industrialists did, that as a new economic sector
during that age, industry, notably manufactures, transpor-
tation, and banking services, need to be fostered by the
government into the stage of expansive maturity (Conte et
al., 1981). Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, opposed
him by looking for democratic agrarian decentralization
in order to protect farmers. He believed that farmers are
American ‘precious’ citizens whose economic liberties need
to be protected from political economic tyranny (Conte et
al., 1981). The debate reflected the US between the late
18th and 19th century when their development policies
changed from agriculture-based economy to industry-based
one.
At the nationalism stage of ‘establishment’ and ‘emer-
gency,’ laissez-faire stance dominated the US political
economy. Both fellow Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Ameri-
can supported non-intervention economic governance
through a financial and fiscal system, despite their differ-
ence between the former’s agrarian democracy and the
latter’s tendency toward very-slow industrialization. For
example, Andrew Jackson during his presidency discon-
tinued Hamiltonian national bank—something that his
predecessor could not do. He believed that Hamiltonian
national bank would serve only industrialists’ interest rather
than agrarians’ interest (Conte et al., 1981). Aside from
lowering import tariffs down, he also opposed any bot-
tom-up development project which involved federal fund-
ing, such as the veto of the Maysville Road project which
connected several states (Shmoop, 2018). The raison d’etre
behind those policies was that he had personally hated
debt since his day one as a land speculator in Tennessee
(Smith, 2011). From his point of view, he did not want his
presidency was fulfilled by debt from banking institutions,
so he decided to pay all national debt off—the only time
when the US was free from any debt.
During nationalism stage of ‘maturity,’ as the result of
the reconstruction era, the US economy was about to be
directed toward industrialization. Federal government in-
tervention was needed to regulate the path. Several new
institutions were established between 1890-1945 such as
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Food and Drug
Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission
(Conte et al., 1981). Under the New Deal, government
intervention extended enacted in order to relieve for the
unemployed poor, recover the economy, and reform the
financial system to prevent similar another Great Depres-
sion. New laws also accompanied more institutions estab-
lishment like Civilian Conservation Corps, the Civil Works
Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and
the Social Security Administration (e.g., National Indus-
trial Recovery Act and Banking Act of 1933, Wagner Act,
Social Security Act, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933). During World War
II, greater government intervention toward the US mar-
ket directed all production and financial capacities to wage
armed forces in both Pacific and European frontier, esca-
lating economic output tremendously. It was the only pe-
riod in US history when they reached its highest form of
Hamiltonian dream.
Entering nationalism stage of ‘expansion,’ US economy,
especially its industries, had matured and ready to com-
pete globally. American entrepreneurs, industrialists, and
financiers who benefited from the involvement of the US
in World War II, making profitable excuses to produce
more goods and services and lend some credits for foreign
economies. The need for economic recovery in post-war,
Europe in the context of communism prevention also gave
sufficient space for the American economy to expand. It
also marked the radical change of production structure in
US industry (from small mass production to globalization
of production network), making US cheaper products
outflew toward the global market, along with their foreign
direct investments (FDI). Such economic expansion got
its peak momentum during the 1970s and 1980s. Follow-
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ing the end of Fordism and Oil Crisis in 1973, many US
enterprises consider outsourcing their production aboard.
According to Charles-Albert Michalet (1976), they imple-
mented ‘workshop affiliates’ which dispersed production
system into smaller units and spread them to many regions
with cost-and-benefit consideration. It made their produc-
tion output larger and cheaper which attracted more con-
sumers. Immediately, they dominate the global market in
which other multinational corporations from other coun-
tries in Europe and East Asia would soon follow.
It can be inferred that the development of American
nationalism—from ‘establishment’ to ‘expansion’—corre-
lates with the US economic maturity in the process. Pull-
ing out interests between political and business elites within
US political-economic governance combined with exter-
nal dynamics has made federal government implementing
‘strategic economics’ in the sense of what Lind and Chang
have told us. Nationalism has caused the US to act prag-
matically toward the dynamics of the global economy.
When they transited from agrarian country toward indus-
trialized (and also services) nation, they need political-eco-
nomic governance which guarantees peaceful socio-eco-
nomic and socio-political disruption. In this case, US gov-
ernment had preserved stability through forceful mea-
sures—from domestic tax, international duties, some es-
tablishments, and even military campaign—to make pre-
occupied changes in global production, financial, and even
knowledge structure benefits them. It is when the US has
realized that they become the holder of structural power
in world political economy; they change the path by openly
agreeing globalization of world economy in which they
choke it to other countries. It eventually makes sense of
US economic nationalism at the very definitive basis pre-
viously.
DONALD TRUMP’S PRESIDENCY: A THREAT TOWARD
AMERICAN CIVIC NATIONALIST TRADITION?
Bart Bonikowski and Paul DiMaggio (2016) explained
varieties of American nationalism prior to the beginning
of Donald Trump’s presidency. They revealed that 24% of
respondents perceived their identity as American as ‘ar-
dent,’ characterized by strong feeling on US citizenship,
deep devotion on US institution and law, urging to be
living in America for at least a year, and embracing Protes-
tant ethic. Furthermore, 38% of respondents have even
restrictive perception about American identity which is the
escalated characteristic of the previous type of national-
ism, which is added by a strong pride of American
exceptionalism. These strong senses of American nation-
alism represented middle-low income, middle-low edu-
cated, mid-life, and white Midwestern and Southern popu-
lation. Bonikowski and DiMaggio argued that ethnocul-
tural sentiment has risen to prominence since they thought
that American Dream—which the ideal that every US citi-
zen should have an equal opportunity to achieve success
and prosperity through hard work, determination, and
initiative—has not been realized. It contradicts other two
minor varieties of American nationalism—the ‘disengaged’
and creedal nationalism—which believe that they success-
fully achieved the American Dream. These sentiments are
motivated by multicultural youth who dominantly settle
in both East and West Coast.
Their description on varieties of American national-
ism nearly represents Trump’s constituents. According to
CNN Exit Polls for 2016 US presidential election (2016),
his supporters dominantly comprises middle-low educated,
religious, white protestants—regardless of their genders—
who live in Mid-west and South. The difference between
references is that Trump’s constituents consist of middle-
high income population instead of the opposite. Yet,
Trump’s campaign addressed his inconvenience about US
politics by blaming ‘established yet corrupted’ political and
business elites who hold power as sources of US claimed
decline. He juxtaposed himself with them as a sign of his
defiance from such elites before changing his claim in his
later campaign that he stood for the people (Friedman,
2018).
His rhetoric flows, however, are intriguing. First, the
word ‘democracy’ itself consists of two Greek words, demos
as ‘(common) people’ or ‘mob’—according to Plato’s point
of view, ‘ignorant ones’—and kratos which means ‘to rule’
(Crick, 2002). Trump hijacked democracy by mobilizing
his ‘ignorant’ supporters for his political gain. By raising
nationalistic issues such as undocumented immigrants
which cause US recent high crime rate, Islamic terrorism
on national security, military and security blunders, and
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economic globalization, Trump wanted to bind and ex-
pand his grassroots supporters with shared conservatism.
Second, continuing from the previous point, Trump’s cam-
paign framed with catchy slogans such as ‘Make America
Great Again’ and ‘America First’ is very critical. Agreeing
with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s Prospect
Theory, he made many of his supporters into believing
that the state of the union was abyssal and many people
have lost something into uncertainty and volatility (e.g.,
global economic crisis and Islamic terrorism). At this mo-
ment, his demagogue encouraged American people to be
risk-takers by preferring withdrawal from the old socio-
political and economic establishment and choosing him
with the promise to make America great again (Kanev,
2017).
Third, the incompatibility of what President Trump
has said and the available facts is surpising. According to
Adam Curtis (2016), Trump in his campaign asserted many
facts which were untrue and bore little relationship with
reality. For example, when President Trump highlighted
high-rated crime in which he claimed committed by un-
documented immigrants. Cato Institute and the Marshall
Project researched that 1.53% of native-born Americans
are incarcerated, compared with 0.85% of undocumented
immigrants and 0.47% of legal immigrant despite increas-
ing immigrant population (Rogers, 2018). Furthermore,
The Washington Post fact-checker column awarded Presi-
dent Trump with ‘four Pinocchios’—the lowest rank for
honesty—with 63% out of all his statesmen compared with
other presidential candidates (Farhi, 2016). Surprisingly,
many people bought his demagogue and voted for him in
the ballot. Fourth, as a consequence, his populism was
not as tremendous as it was expected. Trump only secured
46.1% of popular vote, losing to Hillary Clinton who won
48.2% of popular vote. However, Trump’s voter turnout
was sufficiently decisive to be converted into an electoral
college in strategic states in Midwest and South—many of
his core supporter—bringing him to the White House.
Recalling dialectics of nationalism, we can infer that
political elites like Donald Trump had mobilized white
conservatives to support him in achieving his presidency.
He shaped and directed the US political atmosphere in
favor of his political gain by throwing populist-nationalist
discourse in many of his signature issues such as immigra-
tion, national security, Islamic terrorism, and international
trade. The way Trump introduces American populist-na-
tionalism during his political reign resembles the stage
‘emergency’ of American nationalism during the rise of
populist President Andrew Jackson and later Jacksonian
democratic tradition. It can potentially deconstruct Ameri-
can civic nationalism with liberal tradition. The reason is
that President Trump’s nationalist performativity has trig-
gered the decline of creedal nationalism and bring ardent
(even restrictive) one into the discourse. American iden-
tity is about to be restored to exclusive, nativist, and even
violent features with nationalism stage of ‘emergency.’ Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed that race-based
hate crimes increased the day after the 2016 Trump’s elec-
toral victory (Williams & Hauslohner, 2018). Moreover,
Karsten Muller and Carlo Schwarz (2018) revealed the
strong correlation between accounts with high numbers
of followers (such as President Trump) tweeting hate speech
and racist remarks, and follow-up violence and hatred in
public and even in private settings—since the beginning of
Trump’s campaign in mid-2015. Not to mention that both
Trump’s campaign and presidency are piggybacked by the
rising alt-right movements with shared xenophobic inter-
est. It can be considered as a betrayal of American
exceptionalism.
NATIONALIST MOTIVATION OF DONALD TRUMP’S TRADE
POLICY
Given socio-political and demo-economic explanation
during his campaign and presidency, it can be assured that
President Trump is tied with his political supporters who
give him both framed policies constituent base and its ef-
fect on policies rationalization. First of all, recalling Donald
Trump’s constituents which comprise dominantly Midwest-
ern and Southern middle-low educated, religious, and
white Protestants with a restrictive sense of American na-
tionalism, they are divided into primary and secondary
ones. The primary constituents who convincingly influ-
ence Trump’s policy-making come from businesspeople
and industrialists. Similarly, Nicholas Carnes and Noam
Lupu (2017) said that Trump voters were political-economi-
cally affluent people. Even though they barely have a col-
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lege education, it does not guarantee their status as work-
ing-class automatically.
Specifically, businesspeople and industrialists who be-
came Trump’s voters were coincidentally focused on eco-
nomic sectors which become Trump’s main concerns—
manufactures, heavy machines, electronics, automotive,
and even extractives. Such big names included Charles
Koch (Koch Industries), US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur
Ross (Manufacture Groups), Darwin Deason (ACS and
Xerox), and Carl Icahn (Icahn Enterprise and Federal-
Mogul) (Hackett, 2016). President Trump also secured vot-
ers from Rust Belt states (New York, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Wiscon-
sin—regions whose industries have declined since 1973 Oil
Crisis). He promised to revive traditional industries to sup-
port his ‘Bring Back American Job’ campaign (McClelland,
2016). Those billionaires and states were tied with their
enormous labors/workers—secondary constituents in
grassroots level—whose incomes were relatively middle-low.
Elites mobilized them to support Trump in return for va-
cancies in the US job market. Put together into massive
political constituents for Trump, they narrowed their po-
litical-economic interests into the urgency of reviving
American manufacture industries which will increase do-
mestic production and create more job opportunities. In
this case, they are going to need federal government inter-
vention to issue policies which will both attract multina-
tional offshored industries back to the country and de-
crease imports through protectionist measures.
Political economic aspiration from his constituents with
given socio-political background shaped President Trump’s
trade policy rationalization. Consistent with Ka Zeng’s
argument (2004), President Trump saw US trade struc-
ture with trading partners. They believed that if a country’s
trade structure with partners is competitive, they are prone
to be aggressive regarding their national trade interest and
thus protect their national market through several protec-
tionist policies and vice versa. Let us take a look at some
commodities which President Trump is most concerned.
The first one is photovoltaic solar power (solar panel). The
Quote Company (2018) recorded significant decrease of
solar panel price from USD 101.5 per watt in 1975 to only
61 cents per watt in 2015 while there is significant growth
of global solar panel installation from 2 to 64.892 Mega-
watt at the same period. China has become the most sig-
nificant contributor toward such stark change since its
booming production during the last decade which domi-
nated 30.4% of global production (IEA, 2016). From this
perspective, US-China trade relations in solar panel in-
dustries become competitive in which China is a winning
side. Second, the US government also problematized world
washing machine industries. Euromonitor shows that the
US government considered 1.2 million units of imported
washing machines would threaten American washing ma-
chine industries which grow from 7.5 million units to 9
million units between 2014-2017 (Bloomberg, 2018). This
assumption is based on US washing machine trade deficit
with the world where its exportation from that 9 million
units does not reach half of its importation. It triggered
USITC to impose tariff 40-50% on both imported photo-
voltaic solar power and washing machine to the US mar-
ket (US International Trade Commission, 2017).
Third, US steel industries, President Trump’s main
agenda during his campaign and presidency, were also con-
sidered to be threatened by foreign steels. According to
the World Steel Association (2018), world steel produc-
tion grew from 1.35 million tons in 2007 to 1.69 million
tons in 2017 in which, once again, China dominated with
49.2% of it. However, its demand prospect is predicted to
decelerate approximately 1.6-1.8%. More than the decel-
eration of global economic growth which infected China,
India, and the US themselves, a growing trend to reduce,
reuse, and recycle secondhand and scrapped steels
sustainably also affects a decreasing demand for world fresh
steel (Maytaal, 2017). As a result, world steel oversupply
occurred and decreases the price. According to Wilbur
Ross, US Secretary of Commerce, it would have burdened
US steel industries since domestic production cost is rela-
tively high. Once again China is behind the scene.
The same condition also applied to US aluminum in-
dustries. The US aluminum production between 1996-2017
decreased from 3.6 million metric tons to 0.9 million
metric tons while at the same time its importation grew
from 2 million metric tons toward 5.5 million metric tons.
Such gap between huge imports and fewer production
made average productivity-to-capacity ratio in January 2017
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only reaches 48%, relatively low than China (77%), Rus-
sia (85%), India (71%), Canada (99%), and United Arab
Emirates (100%) (US Department of Commerce, 2018).
US low rate of productivity-to-capacity ratio adjusted do-
mestic production cost which will affect the unemploy-
ment of aluminum labors. Whereas, both steel and alumi-
num industries become the backbone of US industries
revitalization and such impotence is miserable for both
economic growth and job opportunities. That is the main
reason behind Trump’s tariffs on imported steel and alu-
minum which reach respectively 10% and 25%.
Aside from trade structure in commodities, President
Trump delivered his concern regarding Chinese govern-
ment policies which require a technological transfer in
return for investment in the mainland. Representing
USTR, Robert E. Lighthizer investigated threatening Chi-
nese technological transfer, intellectual property, and in-
novation policies. It can be understood that such policies
can make China upgrading their commodities’ quality up
to the same level of US enterprises instantly. Such prac-
tices can be considered as unfair as US companies’ selling
rate, income and profit rate, business opportunities, and
global added value chain will be negatively affected (US
Trade Representative, 2018). It can be inferred that such
comprehensive data and analysis above confirm Donald
Trump’s argument of trade structure in which he referred
to it as ‘unfair’ and ‘competitive.’  It gives nothing but a
justification regarding his tariffs and quotas policies in a
nationalist sense—to protect domestic industries and jobs—
resulting in aggressive trade wars internationally. Such
perspective shut the Chinese Embassy for the US whose
claim about US-China trade relation is a state of absolute
gains, if not complementary one, many years ago (Shan,
2010).
In addition to the urgency of providing new job oppor-
tunities for American by reviving national industries and
prevent threatening imported goods, President Trump also
chose to use a harsh approach to immigration policy. He
wanted to limit as much as possible immigrant workers,
either highly-skilled or less highly-skilled ones, indiscrimi-
nately. As such, he targeted around 26,370 personnel units
would be steady for US border patrol in 2017, 25% higher
than previous year (Kamarck, Hudak, & Stenglein, 2017).
Availability of future job vacancies for (native) Americans
becomes the primary purpose. This policy, just like his
approach on trade structure and intellectual properties, is
based on nationalist motivation who seeks for nation-based
relative gains in international economic affairs so to be
redistributed domestically—privileges for a member of a
nation/country. However, according to Harry J. Holzer
(2018), indiscriminative of immigration limitation policy
will negatively affect the US labor market. The reason is
that the labor market will have deficit labor forces which
level up wage rate. High wage rate will force market mecha-
nism to raise the price in goods which the public would
consume, resulting in the decrease of real income labors
would get home. That could be a negative political eco-
nomic backlash for Trump’s presidency.
Therefore, the economic and trade policies pattern
showed by Donald Trump’s presidency above became simi-
lar to his populist-nationalist political aspirations. It got
clear that Trump must be attached with his populist con-
stituent, including their economic interests, to preserve
his political support in present and future. What made it
relatively unique is that Trump on the other side also uti-
lizes his supporters’ background and their perception about
national identity and its consequential pride and hubris
which shape their interest in economic and trading affairs,
especially in international level, to smooth his campaign
to the presidency. In effect of American nationalism stages
on national economic behavior, what President Trump has
done with the US political economic governance became
coherent with its pragmatism toward global political eco-
nomic dynamics—protectionist policies in return of
reindustrialization and so-called job protection without
total withdrawal from it. However, in the context of elite-
society dialectics of nationalism, President Trump some-
how only resembled ‘emergency’ stage of American na-
tionalism with Jacksonian populism. Still, the historicity
of Trump’s populist-nationalism and its protectionist trade
policy is coherently relevant.
CONCLUSION
From the perspective of economic nationalism, this
article concludes that Donald Trump’s protectionist trade
policy (tariffs and quotas) can be considered as an attempt
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to not only protect national economic interest but also to
secure his political power before his constituents and their
national postulation. As most of his constituents—religious,
middle-high income, middle-low educated, white, South-
ern and Midwestern Protestants—benefit from government
policies which addressed job opportunities for Americans
and reindustrialization (especially of manufactures in pre-
viously agglomerated industrial areas), President Trump
chose to uplift the issue of trade and industries to the policy
discourse. Having been framed under his nationalistic
narratives since his campaign to the White House in mid-
2015 until his current presidency (e.g., ‘Make America
Great Again’ and ‘America First’), President Trump’s pro-
tectionist trade policies attack the so-called unfree, unfair
international trade structure due to the ‘menace’ of for-
eign commodities (and even labors). Historically speaking,
such political-economic manifestation is justified by the
construction of American nationalism. Through Hegelian
dialectics of nationalism, it can be understood that power
relations between American political elites/system with its
citizens embraced American civic tradition whose prag-
matism toward the dynamics of the global political
economy is inherent. Despite different political economic
context with agriculture-based Andrew Jackson’s presidency
centuries ago, it should be noted that Trump’s presidency
shares similar logic of economic nationalism and its
governmentality with Jacksonian democracy, thus shaped
the way President Trump saw ‘free’ and ‘fairness’ in inter-
national trade and US position within it.
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